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Self-selecting into being a dictator: Distributional Consequences 1*

Lara Ezquerra1, Praveen Kujal2

Abstract:
We allow for principals to self-select into delegating, or not, the allocation decision to an
agent in a modified dictator game. The standard dictator game arises when principal´s
choose to make the allocation decision themselves. Dictators thus obtained transfer lower
amounts to receivers, relative to when the decision making is passed to an agent under
delegation (or in the standard dictator game). Principals choose to be a dictator nearly
half of the time. The average amount transferred by individuals who delegate in more
than half of the rounds is significantly higher than the quantity transferred by those who
choose to delegate in less than half of the rounds. Finally, the distributional consequences
of delegating, or not, vary with less inequality obtained when the decision is delegated.
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1. Introduction
Delegation is an important management tool in organizations and is desirable for
efficiency reasons, leader formation, nurturing of talent and to pass decision making to
outside sources. Lately, the experimental literature has studied delegation in scenarios
such as hierarchical structures (Hamman et al. 2010; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012;
Oexl and Grossman, 2013; Gawn and Innes, 2019), bargaining (Ferhrstman and Gneezy,
2001) or labour markets (Charness et al. 2012). The results from this experimental
literature (Hamman et al. 2010, Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012 and Oexl and Grossman,
2013) point towards delegation being used as a tool to hide behind unfair decisions. That
is, a principal may hire an agent to make self-interested or immoral decision that the
principal would be reluctant to take more directly (Hamman et al., 2010).
Hamman et al. (2010) studied allocation decisions under compulsory delegation
and find that the amount redistributed to recipients is significantly lower than in the
standard dictator game. In their structure principals do not make allocation decisions and
need only to select agents for that decision. They find that principal’s choose agents that
transfer lower amounts to recipients thereby increasing their payoffs. Principals select
agents to maximize own payoffs. Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) employ a dictator game
with four players: a principal, an agent and two recipients. They wanted to understand the
responsibility attribution of delegated decisions by observing who is punished for unfair
distributions. In their setting principals’ can divide own and recipients’ endowment
themselves or pass the choice to an agent. Endowment can only be divided in two ways:
fair or unfair (with unfair benefitting the principal). After observing the division of the
endowment, one of the two recipients can punish the rest of the players by lowering their
final earnings after the division of the endowment has been made. They find that
delegation is effective at avoiding principals being held responsible for the unfair decision
as recipients also punish agents for unfair decisions.
In this paper we run experiments with a variant of the standard dictator game
(Hamman et al., 2010) where the principals can decide on making the allocation
themselves or pass the decision to an agent. An interesting outcome of endogenizing the
delegation decision is that if the dictators decide on making the allocation decision
themselves then we revert to the standard dictator game, that is, dictators directly decide
on the transfer amount. If principals, however, decide to delegate then we have the
decision making delegated to an agent and the delegation version of the game is
implemented a la Hamman et al. (2010).
2

Even though a-priori non-consequential, as we know from prior experiments, selfselecting in this way can impact decision making. There are two classic contributions
along these lines. First are Hoffman et al. (1996), in what was a procedural variation,
where they find that increasing social distance resulted in outcomes closer to the game
theoretic prediction. Second are Cherry et al. (2002), where the allocation decision is over
earned wealth, they obtain lower allocations with 95% of the dictators playing according
to game theoretic predictions. Self-selecting into being a dictator is a procedural variation
in our framework that could significantly impact allocations in our setting relative to the
standard dictator game. In the delegation version of the game, following Hamman et al
(2010), we can hypothesize that when agents delegate the allocation decision then we
should expect significantly lower allocations relative to the standard dictator game.
We proceed as follows; given that we are interested in the consequences of
endogenous delegation, we first replicate the standard dictator game and the treatments
in Hamman et al (2010) obtaining qualitatively similar results. As in Hamman et al (2010)
we replicate that subjects redistribute less under compulsory delegation than under the
standard dictator game.2 We also replicate their alternating delegation structure where
players first play eight rounds of compulsory and then endogenous delegation. Again, we
replicate their results obtaining qualitatively similar results. That is, once a lower social
norm is established (in the form of lower transfers) in the prior compulsory delegation
stage, it carries over to the endogenous delegation scenario. 3
Our two main results are novel. If delegating serves to pass on the responsibility
of “immoral” decisions, we find that when the allocation decision is passed on to an agent
the average amount transferred to receiver´s is greater than when the principals
themselves decide. Further, the amount, is not significantly different from the standard
dictator game. Secondly, we find that those who make the allocation decision themselves,
transfer significantly less to recipients as dictators in comparison to the standard dictator
game. Participants that self-select and take on the role of dictators are less prosocial on
the average. The amount transferred to recipients by principals acting as dictators under
endogenous delegation is significantly lower than when the decision is delegated to an
2

This difference is significant using a Mann-Whitney test: z=8.234, p=0.00.
Hamman et al. (2010) also run an endogenous delegation treatment with no competition amongst agents.
That is, one can choose between delegating to the only agent available (the same for all the rounds) or not
delegating and making the decision. In order to do this, they vary the payoff structure of agents since each
agent can only work for one principal. They obtain that the majority of principal’s delegate and the
amount shared with the recipients is similar to what was observed under the compulsory delegation
treatment.
3

3

agent (3.14 vs 3.84). Additionally, this amount (3.14) is significantly lower than what is
obtained in the standard dictator game (3.57). Clearly, endogenizing the choice to
delegate or not sorts agents into two types, the less prosocial who assume the role of a
dictator and the prosocial that delegate4 the allocation decision and transfer more.
When the principal´s choice is reduced to only choosing an agent they select the
agent that maximizes their own payoffs resulting in lower allocations (as in Hamman et
al., 2010). This amount is even lower than that obtained under a principal self-selecting
into making their own allocation decision, delegating the decision, or in the standard
dictator game. The relationship between low amounts transferred and being selected for
an agent is clear under compulsory delegation. This relationship is, however, weaker
under endogenous delegation. Our results support the assertion (Hamman et al., 2010)
that when delegation is forced principals maximize own payoffs taking no responsibility
for the decision of the agents and transfer less.
Ours is a procedural variation (a la the double-blind procedure in Hoffman et al.,
1996) of the standard dictator game that results in lower allocations. This is also along
the lines of Cherry et al. (2002) where 95% of the outcomes are according to game theory
predictions when the dictator bargains over earned wealth. Our manipulation is “milder”
than either and the results are still striking with the average allocation made by principals
who do not delegate being 2.6 in the last four periods (relative to 3.5 when the decision
is passed to an agent). Even though in a different environment, the sorting argument put
forth by Lazear et al. (2012) may also be applicable here. In Lazear et al. (2012) dictators
can sort into a dictator game or receive a fix payoff without making the allocation
decision. They find that when subjects can sort out sharing decreases. While, in Lazear et
al. (2012) individuals sort into those who share reluctantly, i.e. avoid the opportunity to
share, in our case those that want to share less may sort into making the allocation decision
themselves as the alternative is not a fix payoff as in Lazear et al. (2012) but an agent
who decides on your behalf.
In our framework the dictator game is obtained as an outcome of individuals selfselecting into the role. There are no features such as anonymity or earned wealth in our
design where one earlier obtained stronger outcomes in favor of the game theoretic
predictions. Given this our result is interesting as it shows that seemingly small variations

4

Note, this could also be related to other aspects such as confusion or lack understanding of the game.
However, in our repeated framework this should not be a problem.
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can result in significantly different outcomes in the dictator game. One can say that by
self-selecting the dictators may feel empowered, or individuals with certain
characteristics (e.g., less pro-social) are likely to self-select into the role. One explanation
could be that under endogenous delegation the principal can keep the right to make the
decision. Along similar lines are Collins et al. (2018) where entitlement over the power
to divide an endowment affects the result. In our environment we could have that
principals under endogenous delegation feel more entitled to share less than principals in
the baseline or, as earlier mentioned, feel empowered when they self-select into the role.
Regardless, allocations are still greater than under compulsory delegation.
Finally, the knowledge of having an extra competitor (the principal) may also
affect agent behavior and result in lower competition (Garcia and Tor, 2009). We can,
however, rule this out. In our first treatment we inform the agents that the “Principals
may make the choice themselves or delegate.” This suggests that the agents may view
themselves as competing with the principals. To see if this was important to our results
we made a subtle change in the instructions by running another endogenous delegation
treatment (informationally closer to compulsory delegation) in which agents did not know
that there is an alternative to choosing an agent. That is, they are only informed that
“Agent A has to decide to delegate or not the decision”. They are not explicitly informed
that the principals may make the decision themselves. We find no differences between
these two endogenous delegation treatments. We can thus conclude that an agents’
decisions cannot be explained by differences in information or expectations of competing
with the principal and has to do with the game structure.

2. Literature Review
The meta-study of Engel (2010) (data from more than 120 studies) shows that the average
amount redistributed to recipients in dictator games represent 28% of the total5. The
average amount allocated is sensitive to procedural variations. For example, it can
increase if we vary social distance and dictators are identified by their surname (Charness
and Gneezy, 2008) or if anonymity is not ensured (Hoffman et al. 1996). Furthermore,
framing effects also vary the amounts transferred to recipients (Brañas-Garza, 2007; List,
2007). Brañas-Graza (2007) shows that emphasizing the dictators’ responsibility over the
outcome increases dictators’ generosity. List (2007) shows that framing affects the
5

Similar average amounts are obtained by Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) who perform a similar analysis
with dictator games conducted in developing counties.
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outcome by changing the instructions and asking dictators to take money from recipients
instead of asking them to split the endowment. Finally, in their classic paper Cherry et al
(2002) show that a large proportion of the outcomes are as predicted if the endowment is
earned by the dictators. It is clear that procedural variations (social distance, framing or
earned money) can significantly impact the allocations dictators make, with some
increasing allocations while, others significantly decrease them.
Some of the delegation literature has also used the dictator game (Forsythe et al.,
1994) to study distributional consequences of hierarchical delegation (Hamman et al.
2010; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; Gawn and Innes, 2019). The main result from this
literature is that delegation results in less egalitarian outcomes than the standard dictator
game. In addition, Gawn and Innes (2019) try to understand the effect of endogenous
delegation in a one-shot dictator game with no punishment option nor agents where
principals can choose to delegate or not, knowing that if you delegate the decision of
another dictator playing in another session will be randomly implemented. They find that
those who delegate are the more generous dictators in a simple dictator game with no
delegation option. Others have studied delegation using the ultimatum game (Fershtman
and Gneezy, 2001) and labor market environments (Fehr et al. 2010; Charness et al. 2012
and Maximiano et al. 2013). The bargaining literature also finds that compulsory
delegation increases the proposers share.
Besides the studies mentioned above Oexl and Grossman (2013), Coffman (2011) and
Garofalo and Rott (2017) extend previous results. The first ones find that intermediation
reduces principal’s punishment. Oexl and Grossman (2013) find that by delegating to an
intermediary, a principal can effectively shift blame onto the agent even when doing so
necessarily eliminates the possibility of a fair outcome. Coffman (2011) studies
punishment in a scenario in which the punisher is not affected by the endowment
decisions made by principals and agents finding that when delegation is implemented
principals are punished less and obtain higher profits. Finally, Garofalo and Rott (2017),
also find that recipients punish both principals and agents for unfair decisions when the
agents' only role is to communicate the decision made by the principal.
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) use an ultimatum game in which proposers can
delegate the offer made to the recipient to an external agent. They find that when
delegation is chosen the payoffs of the proposers’ increase. Choy et al. (2015) also use
the ultimatum game to compare exogenous and endogenous delegation in a bargaining
environment and find that proposals are higher under compulsory delegation. They also
6

find a difference between endogenous and exogenous delegation. Overall there is a
common theme in all these papers, delegation increases payoffs of the proposer/sender
under delegation.
There are other papers that have studied the joint effect of delegation and other
factors such as dishonesty, corruption, information, gender6 or bargaining. Erat (2013),
Drugov et al. (2014) and Sutan and Vranceanu (2016) examine dishonesty in
environments with endogenous delegation of decisions. They use a dictator game in
which proposers can lie about delegating to a third party. They find that imperfect
information increases proposer profits by shifting blame 7. Similarly, Erat (2013) showed
that agents are more frequently hired when they have to lie in a sender receiver game8.
Drugov et al. (2014) find that intermediaries facilitate corruption not by reducing the
responsibility for the outcome but rather by lowering the moral cost of cheating in a
bribery game.
Overall the literature finds that allocations under delegation favour the principal
(Hamman et al. 2010; Bartling and Fischbacher, 2012; Oexl and Grossman, 2013) and
that principal’s select agents that maximize own payoffs (Hamman et al. 2010; Bottino et
al. 2016). We also know that procedural variation such as the double blind (Hoffman et
al, 1996) and earned money (Cherry et al, 2002) result in outcomes closer to the game
theoretic prediction. Based on this our main hypotheses are:
•

Hypothesis 1: Overall, transfers under Endogenous delegation will be
greater than Compulsory and lower than the standard dictator game
allocations.

•

Hypothesis 2: Self-selecting into making the allocation decision
themselves principal’s will give lower allocations than in the standard
dictator game.

6

Bottino et al. (2016) show that in a Compulsory Delegation game female and male principals behave
similarly while as agents’ females show greater redistributive concerns relative to their male counterparts
(even though it is detrimental to them as they are selected less often).
7
Lai and Lim (2012) study the effect of information and communication on delegation (without the cheating
option) and find that generally principals under-delegate even when it is more profitable to do so.
Furthermore, Cettolin and Riedl (2010), use delegation to prove that under uncertainty there is a violation
of rationality in decisions.
8
Surprisingly dishonesty in the sender-receiver game with agent is prevalent even when the identities of
cheaters are revealed to other players (Van de Ven and Villeval, 2015).

7

•

Hypothesis 3: Passing the allocation decision will give the same
outcomes as in the compulsory delegation game and consequentially
lower allocations than in the standard dictator game.

•

Hypothesis 4: Agents that make allocation decisions favorable to the
principal will be selected more often under endogenous delegation.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes our experimental
design. Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 concludes.

3. Experimental design
Our design follows Hamman et al (2010). A total of 236 subjects were recruited
via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) for the experiments at Middlesex University London 9. Each
subject participated in one treatment only. In addition to the experimental earnings,
subjects were paid a £5 show-up fee plus £2 for completing a series of questionnaires
after the experiment. The experiment lasted for approximately 45 minutes and subjects
earned on average £12 in total. We conducted a total of 15 sessions (see Table 1 for a
summary of the experimental design).
The experiment consisted of four treatments. Besides the standard dictator game,
each delegation treatment involved playing a modified dictator game with or without the
delegation option. Each session had 8 or 10 subjects 10. Upon arrival participants were
randomly allocated their roles and seats, read the instructions on their computer screen
and were informed of their role in the experiment. Hereafter, we refer to the principal
(player P), agent (player A) and recipient (player R). 11 The experiment lasted for 12
rounds. Each participant was assigned a role and an identification number for the entire
experiment. The identification number guaranteed anonymity to each participant. They
were also told that pairs of principals and recipients would be randomly re-matched in
each round. In each session there were 2 agents and 3 or 4 principals and recipients (3 in
sessions with 8 subjects and 4 when there were 10 subjects). The agents made decisions
for all delegates in their sessions. At the end of each round players were informed about
their earnings for that round and they could see their decisions and earnings in previous
rounds. They had no information regarding the payoffs or decisions of other players. At
9

Instructions can be found in Appendix E.
The group size varied depending upon show up. Subjects were randomly added to one of the sessions that
were run on the day and time that they selected to go to the laboratory.
11
To avoid framing, in the instructions we referred to the participants as “A”, “B” and “C” instead of
“principal”, “recipient” and “agent” respectively.
10
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the end of the 12th round subjects were asked to fill two brief questionnaires. The first
one included some socio-demographic questions while the second was related to the
decisions taken during the experiment12. They were paid £2 for completing the
questionnaires.
Our payment scheme is a variation of the one in Hamman et al. (2010)13. Both
principals and recipients were paid in cash for one randomly selected round drawn at the
end of the experiment. Agents were given a £5 show-up fee and £5 as starting capital at
the start of the experiment. Their payment was calculated as follows 14:
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = −0.30 + 0.15 ∗ 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
Where, 0.30 represents the fixed costs that agents face in each period regardless
of being selected by a principal. 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 is the number of principals choosing agent i. 15 Agents

could be selected by more than one principal in each round. Selected agents were asked

to make as many decisions as principals choosing them, so that they could allocate
different amounts to different pairs in the same round. 16At the end of the experiment, each
participant received a sealed envelope with their identification number and the amount
they earned. We have a total of four treatments and three different delegation mechanisms
(See Figure 1).
Baseline (BS)
The BS treatment is the standard dictator game. An initial endowment of £10 is
assigned to each pair formed by one principal and one recipient. Each principal decides
how much of the endowment to allocate to the recipient. Once the decision is taken
recipients are informed of their earnings. In each round, principals are told that they have

12

See Table 1 in Appendix B for a summary of the answers to the second questionnaire.
We modified the coefficients of the payment equation to adapt it to the amount of players that we had
per session. Notice that with this function and starting capital agents could never end up with a negative
amount earned.
14
We acknowledge that using this function may limit the agents’ behaviour but it is necessary to include
it to align the interests of agents with principals.
15
Note than in sessions with 8 players the amount of principals that could choose each agent went from 0
to 3 and in sessions with 10 players from 0 to 4. In treatments with delegation principals could always
select one of the two agents available in the session.
16
Agents had to make as many decisions as principals selecting them so that independent decision
making was enhanced. However, we acknowledge that since the same agent makes multiple decisions
these decisions may not be completely independent.
13
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to divide an endowment of £10 between themselves and a randomly matched recipient.
The treatment had 40 participants participating in 4 sessions.
Endogenous Delegation (ED-1)
In this treatment we had 96 participants in 11 sessions. A third player, the agent
(A), is introduced (Hamman et al., 2010). Principals can pass on the allocation decision
to one of the two available agents, A1 or A2, or make it themselves. 17 The agents are
informed that the principals can delegate or make the decision themselves. The two
agents thus know that they are competing amongst themselves and the principal.
Note that, the knowledge of this extra competitor may generate beliefs (of
agents) on the principal affecting agent’s behavior and resulting in diminished
competition (Garcia and Tor, 2009). We thus ran another treatment where we made the
ED treatment informationally closer to the CD experiments. That is, we only inform the
agents that “Each principal has to decide to delegate or not the decision of dividing the
endowment on one of the two agents”. Informationally, this treatment lies between CD
and ED-1. This is the treatment ED-2 below. 18

Endogenous Delegation without Information (ED-2)
As mentioned earlier in this treatment the agents were only informed that the
principal chooses to delegate or not to them (see instructions in Appendix E). Recall that
in ED-1 agents knew that compared to compulsory delegation, they had an extra
competitor, the principal. We ran this treatment in order to test whether the explicit
knowledge of having an extra competitor, affects agent behavior. We had 56 participants
participating in 6 different sessions.

Treatment 4: Compulsory Delegation (CD)
This is a replication treatment (Hamman et al., 2010). The agent makes the
decision regarding the division of the endowment between the principal and the recipient.

17

Following Hamman et al. (2010) we also run an ED treatment with 15 participants (3 agents, 7
principals and 7 recipients) and found that our main results remain constant when the size of the market is
bigger. The results of this extra treatment can be found in Appendix D.
18
Following Hamman et al (2010) we also ran a treatment in which subjects participate in a CD treatment
for 6 rounds and ED-1 during the last 6 rounds. We replicated this treatment for consistency reasons. Our
results replicate those of Hamman et al. (2010) where they observe that the behaviour in CD and ED rounds
is similar. In both cases the amounts given to the recipient are low and decrease over time. The results of
this treatment are in Appendix C.
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Each session has two agents: A1 and A2. The principals select one of the two agents to
divide the endowment in each round.19 We run five sessions with a total 44 participants.

A remark is in order here. Notice that the ED design is simply a choice between
the BS and the CD designs. That is, under ED, the principal simply chooses between
either of the two. This, however, comes with a caveat. That is, in the repeated game the
agent may realize that they are also competing with the principal. This was the reason we
ran the ED-2 treatment where the agents were not told that the principal can also delegate.
As we mentioned our results do not change.

Table 1: Summary of the experimental design

Divides the

Baseline

Endogenous

Endogenous

Compulsory

(BS)

Delegation

Delegation

Delegation

(ED-1)

(ED-2)

(CD)

Principal

endowment

Agent/

Agent/

principal

principal

Agent

Sessions

4

11

6

5

Number of

40

96

56

44

20/-/20

37/22/37

22/12/22

17/10/17

subjects
Principals/Agents
/Recipients

Figure 1: Summary of the experimental design

19

In Hamman et al. (2010), principals were randomly allocated to an agent at the beginning of period 1,
introducing the possibility of choosing one agent or the other from round 2 onwards. This study will differ
as principals choose an agent on every possible round, including round 1. We chose not to impose one
round of compulsory delegation before making delegation optional in order to avoid any effect from the
initial round.
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4. Results
4.1. Overall results:
We use the pooled data from the two ED treatments (-1 and -2) in this analysis. Recall,
that the ED-2 was run to test whether the explicit knowledge of having an extra competitor
(the principal) affects agent behavior. We find that agents reallocate similar amounts in
both treatments, ED-1 where agents know that the principal can select an agent or not
delegate and ED-2 where agents do not know the alternative to not choosing them. We
found no significant differences between the two treatments (ED-1: average transfer 3.47
and ED-2: average transfer 3.49; Mann-Whitney test, z= 0.38, p= 0.70) 20. We refer to the
pooled data as ED henceforth. Further, we refer to those who delegate under ED as EDD and those who do not as ED-N.
We now compare allocations under Endogenous Delegation with Compulsory
Delegation and the dictator game. We find that the overall allocations under the standard
dictator game is 3.57. Meanwhile, for the CD and ED treatments the average amounts
shared are, 2.56 and 3.48, respectively (Table 2 below). A Mann-Whitney (rank-sum) test
(Table 3) confirms that the distributions obtained under the standard dictator game and
ED treatments are not different (z=0.98, p=0.33). The outcomes under the standard
dictator game (BS) and CD are however significantly different (z=8.23, p=0.00) with the
average allocations in the BS being significantly greater. Our main result is the
comparison between the CD and ED treatments. We find that the average allocation under

20

Appendix A contains a more detailed comparison between ED treatments.
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the ED treatment is significantly higher than under the CD treatment and the results are
significantly different (z=-7.32, p=0.00).

Baseline
CD
ED
ED1
ED2

Table 2: Mean and standard deviations per treatment
Mean
SD
3.566
2.095
2.558
2.793
3.481
3.062
3.474
2.869
3.494
3.368

BS-CD
BS-ED
CD-ED

Table 3 - Mann Whitney Test
z
p
8.234
0.000
0.982
0.326
-7.320
0.000

We find that Hypothesis 1 is confirmed for the ED-CD comparison but, weakly
confirmed for the ED-BS comparison. We summarize our findings below.

Result 1: Overall, allocations under endogenous delegation are significantly
higher than under compulsory delegation. The outcomes under endogenous delegation,
however, are not significantly different than under the standard dictator game in the
baseline treatment.

4.2. Delegators (ED-D) and Non-Delegators (ED-N):
Under endogenous delegation individuals self-select into making the allocation
decision (as a dictator) or passing it to an agent. As mentioned earlier, if one does not
delegate then the game reverts to the standard dictator game (with the procedural
difference that individuals choose to make the allocation decision). If they, however,
decide to delegate then it is similar to the delegation game in Hamman et al. (2010) (again
with the caveat of self-selecting into a role). The predictions regarding what we expect
under the two scenarios are given by Hypothesis 2 and 3.
A priori, self-selecting into playing the role of the dictator should give us the same
allocations as under the standard dictator game experiments (BS treatment) and
delegating the decision to an agent will give the same outcomes as under the CD
treatment. However, we know from the many experiments with procedural variations that

13

the allocations can go one way or another. In our case, self-selecting into the role
empowers the dictator and hence we conjecture that allocations should decrease.
We will first look at the outcomes under no delegation, ED-N. Hypothesis 2
predicts that amounts allocated under ED-N will be the smaller relative to the standard
dictator game. Note that even though we have no reason to assume a-priori that we should
observe any other result, we know that procedural (Hoffman et al, 1996) double-blind
experiments and earned-money (Cherry et al, 2002) manipulations do matter. Further,
Lazear et al. (2012) find that when the expected earnings from sorting out are smaller,
then non-sharers tend to self-select into being a dictator. This lowers the average
allocations to recipients. However, if sorting is costless then over half the individuals take
the outside option. In our structure, self-selecting into being a dictator is chosen by those

who share less, while more pro-social individuals select the agents. Clearly, the agent can
make uncertain decisions that make sorting out a less attractive option for the less
prosocial. Surprisingly, they still share a positive amount. We thus hypothesize that
sorting out into being a dictator will mainly attract non-sharers who will allocate lower
amounts.
Outcomes under ED-N are significantly different both from the DG (z=2.07,
p=0.04) and ED-D (z=2.83, p=0.00). Also note that the amount allocated by principal´s
acting as dictator´s (3.14 on average in ED-N) is significantly higher than the amounts
allocated under CD (z=-7.92, p=0.00). 21 We thus find lower allocation relative to
delegation (ED-D, 3.84 on average) and the standard dictator game, however, allocations
are higher than under CD. Though it still results in lower allocations to the DG this may
be due to the fact that our procedural manipulation was not as strong as that observed
under Hoffman et al (1996) or Cherry et al (2002). However, the result is surprising given
the mild variation we implemented.
Figure 2 shows the amount transferred to recipients by round in each of the
treatments: BS, CD and for those who delegate and don´t (ED-D and ED-N). We find that
the DG follows a similar pattern to those that delegate under endogenous delegation (EDD). A Mann-Whitney (rank-sum) test of distributions confirms that the populations of BS
and ED-D are not significantly different (z=0.00, p=0.99).22 We find that both Hypothesis
2 holds meanwhile, hypothesis 3 does not hold. This gives us our Results 2 and 3.
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The amounts allocated to recipients are also higher in BS (z=8.23, p=0.00) than in CD.
Finally, a comment on the distributional outcomes. One can easily check for inequality across periods
and treatments using the Gini index. We obtain that the Gini coefficient has a higher value in CD (0.44)
22
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Result 2:
Under endogenous delegation (ED), those that self-select into dictators (ED-N)
transfer significantly less to recipients relative to the standard dictator game.
Result 3:
Under endogenous delegation, those that pass the allocation decision to an agent
(ED-N) allocate similar amounts compared with the standard dictator game (Baseline
treatment), and significantly higher amounts compared with Compulsory Delegation.

One interpretation of our results could be that sorting results in splitting the sample
among those that are less, or more, pro-social. That is, those that decide (not) to delegate
are (less) more pro-social than the others. This has to be treated with caution as most
participants switch between roles. Figure 3 shows the amounts that are allocated to
recipients depending on the type of principal they are paired with (with 0 being a principal
who always delegated and 12 a principal who never delegated). We can, however, look
for the relationship between the number of times the role of dictator is chosen and
allocations henceforth. We find that the average amount transferred by individuals who
delegate in more than half of the rounds is significantly greater than the quantity
transferred by those who choose to delegate in less than half of the rounds (z=-3.76,
p=0.00). We find that those who delegate less, i.e. decide themselves, earn more. This
may suggest that self-selecting may sort individuals into the less and more prosocial.
In Table 4 we present the results for what proportion of principals’ delegate and
the average amount allocated by principals (ED-N) and agents (ED-D). We find that
delegation occurs in roughly 50% of the cases. 23,24

Figure 2: Amounts earned by the recipient by round and treatment

than in BS (0.29), ED-N (0.43) or ED-D (0.41). This shows that, CD generates more inequality, while BS
creates the lowest inequality among the treatments. Meanwhile, the standard dictator game and ED results
are similar.
23
We ruled out potential informational asymmetries affecting our results by running ED-1 and ED-2 and
obtaining the same results.
24
One potential explanation for this result could be that the size of the market was too small (8 or 10
participants in this experiment while Hamman et al. (2010) had 15), that is why we run an ED treatment
where we had 15 participants per session. The results do not substantially vary as we can see in Appendix
D.
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Table 4: Percentage of delegated decisions and amounts redistributed by rounds
Proportion of

Average amounts

Delegated decisions

allocated
Agent

Principal

(1-4)

51%

4.32

3.91

(5-8)

48%

3.66

2.97

(9-12)

47%

3.50

2.60

Figure 3: Amounts earned by the recipient by type of principal

Average amount transferred to
recipient

5
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4
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3
2.5
2
1.5
1
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Number of times the principal does not delegate
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4.3. Agent selection
Now, we look at Hypothesis 4 that states that agents who made decisions favorable
to the principal will be selected more often in the (delegation) treatments CD and ED-D.
We find that the average amount shared by agents that are not chosen by principals in the
next round in CD is 3.89. This is well above the average amount shared by those who are
selected again, 1.81. Clearly agents that allocate smaller amounts to the receiver are
selected more often. The same behavior carries over to ED but principals “react” less to
lower amounts redistributed to recipients. Principal’s switch between agents when the
amount allocated is on average 4.12 and they do not change their delegation strategy when
the amount is 2.86 (the difference is lower but still significant, t=-5.70, p=0.00). Also, in
ED principals who delegate switch agents when they share an average amount of 4.51.
This is significantly higher than when the principal continues delegating to the same agent
in the next round, 2.78. Moreover, principals switch the decision maker (any switch
between agents or delegation decision) more often in ED (49%) han in CD (37%) which
is somehow unexpected. We expect more selfish individuals to switch agents if the
amount they receive is lower. This is what we observe in the CD treatment. However,
note that in the ED treatment these individuals are more likely to sort out and decide by
themselves. This then implies that we should then expect less switching in the ED
treatment on the average.25,26
To better understand the mechanism by which agents are chosen by principals we
performed a series of logistic regressions (with subjects fixed effects) for CD and ED
treatments (Table 5). 27,28 Model 1 and Model 2 analyze the CD data, their dependent
variable is a dummy with value one if the principal decides to switch agents after that
round and zero otherwise. In Models 3, 4, 5 and 6 the data examined is from ED. Model
3 and 4 have as dependent variable a dummy with value one if principals switch from
delegating to not delegating and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in Model 5 and
6 is a dummy with value one if the agent changes the decision maker in any way (from
agents to principal, principal to agents or from one agent to another) from one round to
25

In CD they can switch from one agent to another while in ED they can also switch from an agent to not
delegating and from not delegating to one of the agents.
26
Figures 2 and 3 in Appendix B
represent the proportion of switching in decision maker under ED and CD over time. Switching decreases
over time.
27
We excluded the last round from the regressions to avoid the end game effect.
28
The results hold if, instead of including subject fixed-effects, we cluster errors by subject. We estimated
additional random effect models including other demographic variables of the principal and agents such
as the gender of the decision maker and their age. This does not affect the results.
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another, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are the same for all the models:
the amount allocated to recipients in the previous period and a variable to control for the
round after which they decide to switch the decision maker (only on models 2, 4 and 6).
Looking at CD, models 1 and 2, the variable amount allocated to recipients in the
previous round is positive and significant (0.23 and 0.24 respectively) at a 1% level. This
indicates that in CD principals switch agents in a round when the previously selected
agent allocated higher amounts to the recipient. Agents that are selected are those
allocating lower amounts to recipients. Models 3 and 4 provides us a lower coefficient
associated with the amount given in previous periods by agents (0.11 and 0.10), this
coefficient is also significant at a 1% level. Principals, in this case, switch from delegating
to not delegating when the amount allocated in the previous round is low. Meanwhile,
Models 5 and 6 indicate that in ED higher amounts allocated to the recipient mean a
higher likelihood of a change in strategy in the next round. Note that the size of the
coefficients associated with the amount transferred (0.14 and 0.13) is smaller than in the
CD treatment. In ED principals do switch due to higher amounts redistributed, but the
effect is considerably smaller than in CD. The coefficient associated with round is never
significant.
This result is in line with the previous literature (Hamman et al. 2010; Bartling
and Fischbacher, 2012) where they argue that principals select those agents who share
less with recipients. However, the coefficients associated with the amount shared are
smaller for ED than for CD which is unexpected. Under CD principals are more prone to
switch agents if the amount earned is small, this hints that competition between agents in
CD is greater than under ED. It is not clear why this occurs. One potential explanation is
that agents in CD understand that principals switch agents when they transfer more to
recipients and thus start transferring lower amounts each round.
This is, however, not the case under ED. Under ED, principals also switch their strategy
when they get lower amounts, but in a more moderate way. Consequently, agents may
not realize the relationship between lower amounts and switching strategy in ED and do
not use lower amounts allocated to recipients as a strategy to be selected by principals
over time. This theory is supported when we analyze the data from agents’ perspective.
There is a clear relationship between higher profits for agents (more principals selecting
the agent) and lower amounts reallocated to recipients in CD. We do not find this in ED
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Table 5: Switching in round t based on round t-1
CD

ED

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Amount allocated

0.23***

0.24***

0.11***

0.10***

0.14***

0.13***

to recipient in the

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

previous round
Round

Observations

0.03

-0.03

-0.03

(0.54)

(0.23)

(0.19)

187

187

649

649

649

649

(17)

(17)

(59)

(59)

(59)

(59)

Log likelihood

-71.02

-70.84

-206.96

-206.24

-243.45

-242.58

Prob>chi squared

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.02

0.00

0.00

-The number in parenthesis represents the total amount of principals observed rather than
the amount of observations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

where amounts reallocated to recipients by agents are not connected to the agents’ own
profits. (See Table 2 in Appendix B for a detailed analysis of agent behavior). Another
possibility is that given the payoff structure, more prosocial principals may delegate
increasing an agent´s profit. If the agents think that their principals are pro-social, then
one can expect that they allocate (on average) higher amounts compared to the allocation
in CD. This gives us Result 4:
Result 4: Under endogenous delegation, principals switch agents when they
allocate higher amounts to recipients, however, the reaction is small and as a result
agents do not reallocate lower amounts to recipients. Under compulsory delegation
principals select agents who transfer less to recipients and the effect is greater than under
endogenous delegation.
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5. Conclusions
One of the outcomes of allowing for endogenous delegation is that under nodelegation the standard dictator game is obtained. We find that when individuals selfselect into the role of the dictator they allocate significantly less to the receiver than in
the standard dictator game. Those that delegate the decision to an agent are more prosocial
and on average transfer more. Interestingly, the distributional consequences of
compulsory delegation and not delegating (ED-N) are to increase inequality while
inequality is less under the standard dictator game and endogenous delegation (ED-D).
Lower allocations obtained under ED-N is along similar lines as the results
obtained under the procedural manipulation of Hoffman et al. (1996) and Cherry et al.
(2002). We do not obtain strong results as in Cherry et al (2002) where 95% of the
outcome are in line with game theoretic predictions, however, one would not expect this
given that the manipulation is subtle. The results regardless are un-expected with
allocations significantly decreased. It seems that allowing for individuals to sort into
delegators and non-delegators results in more and less pro-social. An analysis of the
frequency of delegation and the amount transferred confirms a negative relationship
between frequency of no-delegation and the amount transferred.
Contrary to expectations we find that under ED-D, the outcomes are more prosocial. This goes against the principal motivation for delegation in Hamman et al (2010).
It is, however, along the lines of previous studies (Dana et al. 2006; Dana et al. 2007;
Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Grossman 2014) who find that subjects do not always
want to face the outcome of an unfair decision. Along this line Lazear et al. (2012) find
that when subjects can avoid sharing environments, sharing decreases. In Lazear et al.
(2012) the alternative to becoming a dictator is a fixed payoff which sorts subjects in three
groups depending upon the payoff from the outside option. The first group is composed
of those willing to share under any circumstances. Second, non-sharers who never share.
Finally, a third group named reluctant sharers who share if they are dictators and are asked
to share but avoid sharing environments if they can sort out from the dictator game. We
find that in a different scenario where the alternative to be a dictator is delegating in an
agent and not a fix payoff the less pro-social choose to allocate as a dictator and avoid
sharing while the more pro-social delegate. The result in Collins et al. (2018) is also
among similar lines. That is, allocation decisions are lower when they are made by
someone who bought or purchased the right to make the division compared to a subject
who earned this privilege randomly. In our experiment there is random allocation of roles
20

but in endogenous delegation the principal can keep the right to make the decision.
Following previous literature, it may be the case that principals in endogenous delegation
feel more entitled to share less than principals in the baseline. Similarly, another
explanation could be the role of responsibility (Charness, 2000). The responsibility of the
decision lies in the principal more under endogenous delegation as the principal can
actively avoid unfair situations.
Finally, we ruled out any possible information effect that could explain these
results implementing two different endogenous delegation treatments, one with
information on principals’ possible choices and another on which agents did not know
that they were also competing with the principal (informationally closer to compulsory
delegation). The results of these two treatments are identical suggesting that information
asymmetries did not play a determining role.
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